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THE LAW OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
IN VIRGINIA
By ROBERT E. SHEPHERD, JR.*
"If the surgeon has made a deep incision in (the body of)
a (free) man with a lancet of bronze and causes the man's death
or has opened the caruncle in (the eye of) a man and so destroys
the man's eye, they shall cut off his fore-hand."
The Code of Hammurabi'
The law's attitude toward the medical profession has mellowed
somewhat over the years since the above provision was promulgated
some 4,000 years ago.2 However, medicine and the law still have some
difficulty in reaching a reasonable plateau of understanding and
trust, and one major point of contention concerns the law of medical
professional responsibility, or medical malpractice.3 Although there is
a paucity of case law in this field in Virginia, the number of claims
being made against physicians has increased, and it is reasonable to
assume that the number reaching the courts has increased propor-
tionately.4 This article will discuss the rules of law that have developed
*A.B. 1959, LL.B. 1961, Washington and Lee University. Associate, Wicker,
Baker and Goddin, Richmond, Virginia.
This article is based on a paper originally prepared for a graduate Legal
Medicine Course at the Georgetown Law Center, Washington, D.C.
'2 Driver and Miles, The Babylonian Laws § 218, p. 81 (1955).
'The first reported malpractice case was in England in 1374, and the first
reported case in America was Cross v. Guthrey, 2 Root 90 (Conn. 1794). See Stetler,
History of Reported Medical Professional Liability Cases, 3o Temp. L.Q. 366 (1957).
See Sandor, The History of Professional Liability Suits in the United States, 163
A.M.A.J. 459 (1957)-
'This term often causes some difficulty. Malpractice is defined as "any profes-
sional misconduct, unreasonable lack of skill or fidelity in professional or fiduciary
duties, evil practice, or illegal or immoral conduct." Black, Law Dictionary 1111
(4th ed. 1951). The term is also used in the Virginia Code as a ground for suspen-
sion or revocation of a doctor's license: "Is grossly ignorant or careless in his
practice, or is guilty of gross malpractice." Va. Code Ann. § 54-316(4) (Repl. Vol.
1958). The term is used in this article because it has more meaning to physicians
and attorneys than any other, and as used it means nothing more than professional
negligence.
'Statistics furnished to the writer by the National Bureau of Casualty Under-
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in this area, with particular reference to Virginia, and to point out
some of the more vexatious problems peculiar to this field and the
plans, proposals, and mechanisms which have been devised in an en-
deavor to solve them. Professional negligence is not a problem for med-
ical men and women alone, but this paper will be limited to the law
of medical malpractice as it applies to doctors, dentists, and nurses. 6
I
STANDARDS OF CARE AND SKILL
In medical malpractice cases the standard of care and skill is
based on the specialized knowledge or skill of the physician.7 This
standard is defined by the Supreme Court of Appeals as follows:
"'A physician is not required to exercise the highest degree
of skill and diligence possible, in the treatment of an injury,
unless he has by special contract agreed to do so. In the absence
of such special contract, he is only required to exercise such
reasonable and ordinary skill and diligence as are ordinarily
exercised by the average of the members of the profession in
writers in a letter from Peter Zory of the Actuarial Division, dated June 13, 1963,
reflect the following number of claims:
1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 196o
Physicians and Surgeons ............... 21 22 24 24 26 29 32
Dentists ............................. 9 10 12 15 9 8 13
Hospitals ............................ 13 15 13 13 22 27 20
The experience for 1954 is based solely upon Bureau members and subscribers.
The statistics for the subsequent years reflect the experience of all companies re-
porting to the Bureau. The latest year for which statistics were available is 196o.
rSee article in Wall Street Journal, July 26, 1962, reprinted in Virginia Bar
News, Dec., 1962, pp. 7-8; Wade, The Attorney's Liability for Negligence, 12
Vand. L. Rev. 755 (1955)-
OCertain peripheral problems are also not within the scope of this article.
For an excellent discussion of the tort liability of hospitals, see Note, Hospital Tort
Liability and Immunity, 49 Va. L. Rev. 622 (1963). One of the problems raised in
the case of Banovitch v. Commonwealth, 196 Va. 21o, 83 S.E.2d 369 (1954), is discus-
sed in Note, Criminal and Tort Liability of Unlicensed Healers, 41 Va. L. Rev. 961
(1955). Another area of concern has been the relationship between malpractice
and workmen's compensation. See Fauver v. Bell, 192 Va. 518, 65 S.E.2d 575 (1951),
commented upon in 37 Va. L. Rev. 1033 (1951), and in 9 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 318
(1952). See Note, 36 Va. L. Rev. 781 (195o).
7Prosser, Law of Torts 124-135 (2d ed. 1955); Restatement, Torts § 29o, comment
e ('934); McCoid, The Care Required of Medical Practitioners, 12 Vand. L. Rev.
549 (1959) (hereinafter cited as McCoid); Louisell and Williams, Trial of Medical
Malpractice Cases para. 8.04 (1960) (hereinafter cited as Louisell & Williams). An
excellent analysis of the development and theory of malpractice may be found in a
series of articles-Smith, Legal Responsibility for Medical Malpractice, 116 A.M.A.J.
942, 2149, 2490, 2670, 2755, 117 A.M.A.J. 23 (1941)-
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good standing, in similar localities and in the same general line
of practice, regard being had to the state of medical science at
the time.' "s
While the general rules of negligence are applicable to malpractice
cases, there are several unusual features. These elements are the key-
stones of the "common law" of malpractice in the United States. How-
ever, the last twenty years has been marked by considerable flux, with
the development of some variations on these elements. With only a few
exceptions, Virginia has adhered to the basic rule; (a) the reasonable
exercise of skill and diligence; (b) such as is ordinarily exercised by
members of the profession in good standing; (c) who are of the same
general line and school of practice; (d) in similar localities; and (e)
with regard being had to the state of medical science at the time.
(a) Reasonable Exercise of Skill and Diligence
The Code of Hammurabi, quoted above, 9 imposed the liability
of an insurer on the physicians of that day. Under the modem law
of medical malpractice, however, the physician is not an insurer "of
a cure, or even of beneficial results, unless he has bound himself by
special contract to effect a cure."'1 As the Supreme Court of Appeals
said in Ropp v. Stevens:1'
"This court and other courts have gone and will go far to
support the rule that physicians do not and cannot guarantee
successful results, and only owe their patients ordinary but ex-
pert care, attention, and skill such as is usually exercised by
reputable physicians in similar cases; and that they can be held
responsible only in case their patients suffer because of their
negligence. A patient may not recover damages simply because
he does not get well, and where actionable negligence is al-
leged against a physician it must be established by the evi-
dence."' 2
Similarly, a bad result may be considered by the jury as having some
weight, but the result, no matter how bad, "is of itself alone, insuf-
ficient evidence to establish the unskillfulness or the negligence of a
8Michie's Digest, p. 155, quoted in United Dentists, Inc. v. Bryan, 158 Va. 88o,
884-85, 164 S.E. 554, 555 (1932), and in Alexander v. Hill, 174 Va. 248, 252, 6 S.E.2d
661, 663 (194o).
'See text accompanying footnote i.
"°Henley v. Mason, 154 Va. 381, 383, 153 S.E. 653 (1930).
n1 5 5 Va. 304, 154 S.E. 553 (1930).
"Id. at 3o8, 154 S.E. at 554.
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physician... ."13 This poor result by itself is insufficient to raise even
an inference or presumption of negligence. 14
These basic rules are applied to the treatment and also to pre-
liminary examinations. The first case decided in Virginia on mal-
practice, Hunter v. Burroughs,15 dealt with treatment of a patient's
eczema16 on legs and ankles by X-ray and salves, a relatively new tech-
nique at that time. The treatment resulted in severe burns and the
plaintiff obtained judgment in the trial court which was affirmed on
appeal. One of the counts in the plaintiff's declaration rested on the
defendant's duty to make certain tests and examinations before un-
dertaking treatment. The court agreed with the defendant's position
that this duty is to be measured by reference to what other like special-
ists of good standing, in the same or similar localities, would do.' 7 The
court recognized that such a duty does exist: "it is the duty of a phy-
sician in the exercise of ordinary care to warn a patient of the danger
of possible bad consequences of using a remedy.' I s
The physician may be negligent by being too optimistic in his
predictions of success, especially when these are joined with a failure
to warn of the dangers involved. The doctor may be "giving, not a
mere opinion, but a positive assurance of cure."' 9 In Fox v. Mason,
20
decided in 1924, the defendant, sued by a doctor for his fee, denied
that he owed the doctor anything because the post-operative treat-
ment was negligent. The trial court had set aside a verdict for the
plaintiff which action was reversed and the jury verdict ordered re-
instated. The court cautioned, however, that a physician should con-
tinue such treatments as may be reasonably necessary after an op-
eration or instruct some other physician or trained person how to
carry out this treatment or, at the very least, give the patient notice
that he cannot continue such treatment.21
"Hunter v. Burroughs, 123 Va. 113, 135, 96 S.E. 360, 367 (1918). (Emphasis
by the court.)
"Id. at 137, 96 S.E. at 368; Fox v. Mason, 139 Va. 667, 671-72, 124 S.E. 405,
407 (1924); Alexander v. Hill, 174 Va. at 253, 6 S.E.2d at 663.
"Note 13 supra.
"Eczema is an inflammation of the skin. Stedman, Medical Dictionary 496
(Lawyer's ed. 1961) (hereinafter cited as Stedman). See annotations on skin diseases
and X-ray in 41 A.L.R.2d 329 (1955), and 45 A.L.R.2d 1273 (1956). Throughout this
article medical terms will be defined where appropriate and other references will
be given regarding the specific condition or treatment.
"x23 Va. at 131, 96 S.E. at 366.
nid. at 133, 96 S.E. at 366.
2"Id. at 134, 96 S.E. at 367.
2139 Va. 667, 124 S.E. 405 (1924).
"Id at 672-73, 124 S.E. at 407.
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Another Virginia case, Vann v. Harden,22 involved the same prob-
lem, that of the abandonment of a patient by a physician. This case
has been repeatedly cited in texts as the leading case on this point. The
plaintiff's leg had been fractured between the knee and the ankle with
slight comminution, or splintering. The defendant reduced the frac-
ture and set the leg in a plaster cast. He visited the plaintiff on the
two days following this treatment and was told by the plaintiff's
father that the boy was suffering pain and numbness in his toes. The
father expressed his lay opinion that the cast was too tight but the
defendant disagreed, even though the plaintiff had been running a
temperature of up to io3 degrees. On the third day the father tried
to contact the defendant but discovered that he had left town without
leaving instructions; another doctor finally bivalved the cast and
noted some nerve involvement. After nine days the defendant re-
turned to town and discharged the plaintiff from the hospital. A week
after discharge the defendant again refused to examine the leg. A year
and a half later the leg was amputated after extensive treatment by
other physicians. The plaintiff's position at trial was not that the cast
had been negligently applied, but that the defendant had ignored
several basic danger signals and had abandoned his treatment at a
critical time. The Supreme Court of Appeals affirmed a judgment
for the plaintiff and said:
"After a physician has accepted employment in a case it is
his duty to continue his services as long as they are necessary.
He cannot voluntarily abandon his patient. Even if personal at-
tention is no longer necessary in the treatment of an injured
limb, the physician, if the case calls for it, must furnish the
patient with instructions as to its care, and his failure to do so
might become actionable negligence.
23
Thus, a doctor's obligation to his patient may begin prior to treat-
ment, and it may continue long after the critical phase of such treat-
ment.
(b) The Care Ordinarily Exercised by Members of the
Profession in Good Standing
The physician must meet the standard exercised by the average
of the members of the profession in good standing. He impliedly
warrants that he will use that degree of skill, knowledge, and care
22187 Va. 555, 47 S.E.2d 814 (1948).
231d. at 565-66, 47 S.E.2d at 319. See Annot., 57 A.L.R.2d 432 (1958), on abandon-
ment.
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offered by the average reputable physician,2 4 which is neither the
highest, nor possibly even a high, degree of skill and care. An
identical standard is applied to a dentist. In United Dentists, Inc. v.
Bryan,25 the Supreme Court of Appeals dealt with a situation in which
the defendant extracted a tooth after injecting Novocain. An abscess
later developed-the plaintiff established that the needle used in ad-
ministering the Novocain had not been properly sterilized after be-
ing used just fifteen minutes earlier on another patient. The Court of
Appeals affirmed a judgment for the plaintiff and said:
"It seems to be settled that a dentist who holds himself out to
the world as such impliedly represents that he possesses the nec-
essary and proper skill to practice his profession. The degree
of care and skill required is the same as that which would be
exercised by the ordinary prudent dentist, in good standing, in
his community. He does not guarantee or warrant a cure. He is
not required to exercise the highest degree of care and skill
known to the profession."
20
In Alexander v. Hill,2 7 the plaintiff had consulted Dr. Alexander,
a dentist, concerning the advisability of having some of her teeth
removed. Dr. Alexander determined that eleven of her upper teeth
were diseased and he removed them. She was directed to return home
and to apply alternating hot and cold compresses to her face. Shortly
afterwards the defendant was called to her home to remove a piece
of tooth or bone which was protruding from her jaw. The plaintiff
made several subsequent visits to Dr. Alexander who referred her
to another dentist to have a plate fitted. A temporary plate was fitted,
but the plaintiff had a great deal of difficulty with it. Upon examina-
tion, fragments of roots were discovered in six of the sockets from
which teeth had been extracted and their removal necessitated the
installation of a new plate.
The Supreme Court of Appeals reversed a judgment for the plain-
tiff since the evidence showed that an examination of the plaintiff's
mouth, or of the extracted teeth, would not have disclosed the broken
roots, and there was no evidence that "it was the usual and approved
custom and practice of dentists in Richmond to make an X-ray ex-
amination after such an operation. Hence no inference of negligence
-'See 15 Michie's Juris., Physicians and Surgeons § 12 (1951); McCoid at 558;
Louisell & Williams para. 8.04; Stetler and Moritz, Doctor and Patient and the Law
3o8-1o (Regan, 4 th ed. 1962) (hereinafter cited as Stetler & Moritz).
-_15 8 Va. 88o, 164 S.E. 554 (1932).
2,3Id. at 884, 164 S.E. at 555. See Carnahan, The Dentist and the Law (1955).
2174 Va. 248, 6 S.E.2d 661 (194o).
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can be drawn from the failure to make such examination." 28 This
statement points up the practical significance of this part of the rule
pertaining to the standard of care. Since the defendant must be tested
against the skill and diligence usually exercised by the average of
the members of the profession in good standing, there must be testi-
mony relative to what these physicians would have done under simi-
lar circumstances. Consequently, expert testimony for the plaintiff is a
necessary prerequisite to the successful conclusion of a suit against a
physician for malpractice.
2 9
The standard applied to a nurse is stated in Norfolk Protestant
Hospital v. Plunkett,30 to be as follows:
"It is not sufficient to say that a nurse is competent simply
because she is capable of discharging the manual duties in-
cumbent upon her as a nurse. It is a matter of common know-
ledge that the welfare of a patient is as much the responsibility
of the nurse as it is of the physician. If she is lacking in edu-
cational preparation, or if she is guilty of indiscretions that im-
pair her physical or mental status, if she is lacking in that moral
character which imbues the patient with confidence, then it can-
not be said that she is a competent person to be placed in charge
of a helpless patient."31
The court agreed with the verdict of the lower court that the nurse
was negligent in discharging her duties and that the defendant hos-
pital was negligent in its selection and retention of the nurse. All of
the other cases involving nurses or other technicians have been con-
cerned with the vicarious liability of either a hospital or a physician.
(c) The Same General Line and School of Practice
This facet of the general rule insures that the physician will be
tested only against the standards of his own particular specialty or
school of practice. There are two aspects of this rule which have some
importance-first, a physician will not be tested by the testimony of
other practitioners or unlicensed healers who do not practice in, or are
not familiar with, the defendant's specialty; and second, a physician
who subscribes to a particular theory, albeit a minority one, will
nId. at 253, 6 S.E.2d at 663. For a discussion of the necessity of X-ray examina-
tions after treatment, see Annot., 115 A.L.R. 298 (1938).
'-'Hunter v. Burroughs, 123 Va. at 131, 136-38, 96 S.E. at 365, 367.
0162 Va. 151, I73 S.E. 363 (1934).
31d. at x56, 173 S.E. at 365. See Hill v. Leigh Memorial Hospital, 2o4 Va.
501, 132 S.E.2d 411 (1963). See also Hayt, Hayt, Groeschel, and McMullan, Law of
Hospital and Nurse (1958); Lesnick and Anderson, Nursing Practice and the Law
234-304, esp. 247-48 (2d ed. 1955); Annot., 51 A.L.R.2d 970 (1957).
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generally only be tested against the standards applicable to good prac-
tice within that theory.
From the time of the decision in the Hunter case 32 the Supreme
Court of Appeals has adhered to this rule. The Fox case 33 offers the
first clear exposition, through the quotation of various authorities,
of the rule that specialists are held to the standard of care and skill
exercised by like specialists. 34 The court said
"'[O]ne who accepts employment as a specialist must have that
degree of skill and knowledge which is ordinarily possessed by
physicians engaged in that specialty and must exercise his best
judgment in the application of his skill and in the use of or-
dinary care.' 35
The court also stated that:
"'One who holds himself out as a specialist in the treat-
ment of a certain organ, injury, or disease is bound to bring
to the aid of one so employing him that degree of skill and
knowledge which is ordinarily possessed by those who devote
special study and attention to that particular organ, injury or
disease, its diagnosis, and its treatment, in the same general
locality, having regard to the then state of scientific knowl-
edge.' 36
This rule has been consistently followed in Virginia.
In 1940 the Court of Appeals decided the principal case dealing
with the standard to be applied when there are conflicting schools of
practice, Reed v. Church.37 In 1923 the plaintiff had lost his conscious-
ness for a period of thirty days and the defendant was called to treat
him. Spinal taps were taken with the assistance of another doctor
and the plaintiff was found to be suffering from cerebrospinal syphil-
is.3s The defendant treated the plaintiff by removing some spinal
fluid to prevent convulsions and by giving him certain injections, and
the plaintiff regained consciousness. According to the plaintiff's tes-
timony, the doctor assured him he was cured.
See text accompanying footnote 17.
-139 Va. 667, 124 S.E. 405 (1924).
2'For general discussion of law applicable to specialists, see Annot., 59 A.L.R.
1071 (1929).
139 Va. at 670, 124 S.E. at 4o6, quoting 3 Wharton and Stille, Medical Juris-
prudence § 473, P. 459 (5th ed. i9o5).
n139 Va. at 671, 124 S.E. at 406, quoting Rann v. Twitchell, 82 Vt. 79, 71 Ad.
1045 (909).
=175 Va. 284, 8 S.E.2d 285 (1940).
sCerebrospinal syphilis is an infectious disease of the brain and spinal cord.
Stedman at 296, 1470. See i Gray, Attorney's Textbook of Medicine para. 3349
(3d ed. g6i) (hereinafter cited as Gray).
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In 1937 the plaintiff fainted again and was treated by the de-
fendant for a recurrence of the same disease by dosages or tryparsa-
mide,39 an approved treatment for his disease. The plaintiff testified
that after the third of twelve injections of this drug he complained
about his eyes, but Dr. Reed paid no attention to these complaints.
The drug manufacturer's pamphlet warned that the drug could cause
such problems, but the plaintiff's disease could also cause blindness.
The plaintiff finally saw an optometrist and learned there was per-
manent atrophy40 of the optic nerve. The defendant immediately
ceased using the drug and started using other drugs to counteract
these effects. At the time of trial the plaintiff was almost totally blind.
The doctor contended that there were two schools of medical
opinion concerning the developnent of optical difficulties-one sug-
gested that the drug's use be continued in order to alleviate the syphil-
itic condition, and the other school contended that the use of the
drug be discontinued and counteracting drugs be administered. The
defendant therefore argued that if he followed either of these theories
he could not be held negligent. 41 However, the court held this doctrine
inapposite since the defendant, by his own testimony, had committed
himself to one school, and he must be tested by the standards of
that school. When the plaintiff's optical complaints were confirmed
the defendant ceased the administration of the drug. By this act he
showed adherence to the theories of the second school, and whether he
properly followed the standards of that school was a question of fact
for the jury.42 The judgment for the plaintiff was affirmed.
The same problem was involved in a 1958 federal case arising from
the Eastern District of Virginia, Nardini v. Gilbert.43 The plaintiff
suffered from a painful and swollen knee and the defendant decided
on surgery after other treatments failed. He tentatively diagnosed the
problem as a torn medial meniscus, 44 but he performed an explora-
tory operation to make sure. The surgical entry was made from the
lateral, rather than the medial, side of the knee, and the anterior por-
3"Tryparsamide is a drug containing arsenic for the treatment of syphilis.
Stedman at 158o.
4OAtrophy is a wasting away or deterioration. Stedman at 168.
41175 Va. at 292, 8 S.E.ad at 288. See the discussion of testimony by physicians
of a different school in Annot., 78 A.L.R. 697 (1932).
"-Ibid.
36o F.2d 177 (4th Cir. 1958).
"The medial meniscus (also semilunar cartilage) is an internal cartilage of
the knee joint attached to the medial border of the upper articulating surface of
the tibia, or shin bone. Stedman at 919; i Gray at paras. 7.14-7.15.
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tion of the medial meniscus was removed with a tear in it. The plaintiff
subsequently suffered from infection in the area and had some restric-
tion of the motion of her knee. Her expert witnesses testified that
the customary approach to the medial meniscus would be from the
medial, and not the lateral, side, but they did not state that the de-
fendant acted negligently. They only said that they would have op-
erated from a different direction. Therefore, the defendant could not
be found negligent merely because he proceeded in an unorthodox
manner, but only if he was inexpert or unskillful in proceeding that
way.
Thus, this facet of the overall standard can be a two-edged sword.
The medical practitioner is protected by being tested only against the
standards of care and skill exercised by other physicians within the
same specialty who adhere to the same theories of treatment. How-
ever, the physician may reach the level of care and skill exercised by
the average doctor in the same or similar community and yet fall short
of that standard as exercised by the average member of the same
specialty. Also, if the physician relies upon the "school of practice"
as a defense he must be sure he measured up to the proper standard
of practice and technique in following that school or theory.
(d) Similar Localities
Almost every medical malpractice case in Virginia has stressed
the fact that the standard of care and skill to be exercised is that exer-
cised in similar localities. 45 Courts have used language implying that
the standard might be more narrowly delineated but without ampli-
fication. 46 The rationale behind this restriction on the standard is
that courts have reasoned that there are significant differences between
the facilities, opportunities for research, and even the extent of medi-
cal knowledge of physicians practicing in large cities and those prac-
ticing in rural areas. However, the present-day uniformity in the
standards of medical schools and licensing boards have caused the sig-
nificance of the locality to diminish. There is still a need for the courts
to recognize the fact that "due care in a lumber camp might be gross
4511unter v. Burroughs, 123 Va. at 131, 96 S.E. at 364; Henley v. Mason, 154 Va.
at 384, 153 S.E. at 653.
"'See, e.g., "in the locality," Ropp v. Stevens, 155 Va. at 308, 154 S.E. at 554;
"in his community," United Dentists, Inc. v. Bryan, 158 Va. at 884, 164 S.E. at 555,
and Alexander v. Hill, 174 Va. at 252, 6 S.E.2d at 663; "in that community" Reed
v. Church, 175 Va. at 293-94, 8 S.E.2d at 288; " 'in the locality where he practices',"
Vann v. Harden, 187 Va. at 565, 47 S.E.2d at 619; "in this community," Dietze v.
King, 184 F.Supp. 944, 948 (E.D. Va. 196o).
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negligence at Johns Hopkins,"47 but this consideration might be cast
in a different context than the locality of practice.
In Carroll v. Richardson,48 the plaintiff's blood was being drawn by
a student technician in a hospital at the behest of the defendant.
4 9
The plaintiff stood up after the taking of the blood, fainted, and suf-
fered injuries when he struck the floor. He did not allege that his
blood had been negligently taken but that he should have been ad-
vised to remain seated for a while. There was expert testimony that
it was not always advisable to speak to a patient after taking blood.
The court ruled that there was no evidence that it was the custom
in the general area to instruct the patient to remain seated, so it re-
versed the lower court and entered final judgment for the defendant.
As early as 1916, the Minnesota Supreme Court said:
"We think it is plainly correct that the locality in which the
physician or surgeon practices must be considered in determin-
ing whether he has the requisite skill and learning, but we do
not think that he is bound to possess and exercise only that de-
gree of skill and learning possessed by other practitioners in the
same locality, if by that is meant the same village or city. If the
same general locality is meant, as, for instance, the Northwest,
or the state, no fault could be found with such a rule. But in
these days the physician or surgeon in a village like Cloquet
is not hampered by lack of opportunity for advancement. Fre-
quent meetings of medical societies, articles in the medical
journals, books by acknowledged authorities, and extensive
experience in hospital work put the country doctor on more
equal terms with his city brother. He would probably resent
an imputation that he possessed less skill than the average phy-
sician or surgeon in the large cities, and we are unwilling to
hold that he is to be judged only by the qualifications that oth-
ers in the same village or similar villages possess." 50
While the protection of the similar localities rule is still probably
necessary, its importance has been diminished a bit. There has been
great progress in medical education, the exchange of medical knowl-
edge, and medical licensing since this subrule was engrafted to the
4-Fox v. Mason, 139 Va. at 671, 124 S.E. at 406.
4S2oi Va. 157, 110 S.E.2d 193 (1959).
"This is apparently one of only two cases in Virginia involving the vicarious
liability of a physician for the acts of another and it does not discuss this trouble-
some problem. See also Henley v. Mason, note io supra. See Louisell 8= Williams
paras. 16.o1-16.o8; Stetler & Moritz 343-62. Likewise, few cases have arisen in the
area of the vicarious liability of hospitals; see Note, Hospital Tort Liability and
Immunity, 49 Va. L. Rev. 622, 639 (1963).
OViita v. Fleming, 132 Minn. 128, 136, 155 N.W. 1077, 1o81 (1916).
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larger rule, and the language of the Minnesota court almost fifty years
ago should have even more meaning today.
(e) The State of Medical Science
The law has for many years required a physician to keep reason-
ably abreast of medical progress, and the basic legal standard of duty
is directly related to the state of current medical practices. In the Reed
case the court stated that the physician "impliedly represents that he
is keeping abreast of the literature and that he has adopted those
techniques which have become standard in his line of practice." 51 It
would seem, however, that this requirement would be a part of the
requirement that the physician exercise the skill and care normally ex-
ercised by the average of the members of the profession in good stand-
ing who are of the same general line and school of practice. Other phy-





The ordinary rules of negligence are not cast aside in a malprac-
tice action and, despite the legal rules peculiar to such a case, the
plaintiff's action may often founder on the rocks present in any other
negligence case. Proximate causation may be such a rock. In Honaker
v. Whitley,5 3 the plaintiff went to Dr. Honaker for treatment of an
impacted wisdom tooth. The defendant had to exert a great deal of
force to attempt to pull a good tooth to get at the bad tooth and
this tooth broke. The plaintiff became sick and had to go home where
he experienced some pain and locking of his jaws. A second dentist
later pried the jaws open and removed the broken root and the wis-
dom tooth. He testified that the jaw appeared to be all right at that
time. Several days later X-rays revealed that the upper portion of the
plaintiff's jaw was broken. A judgment for the plaintiff was reversed
on appeal because there was no proof that the defendant fractured
the jaw, and his evidence did not negative the possibility that the
second dentist was the negligent party.
V175 Va. at 293, 8 S.E.2d at 288; see also United Dentists, Inc. v. Bryan, 158
Va. at 884-85, 164 S.E. at 555.
nSee Stetler & Moritz 311-12. See also Oleck, New Medicolegal Standards of
Skill and Care, ii Clev.-Mar. L. Rev. 443 (1962).
M12 4 Va. 194, 97 S.E. 8o8 (1919). See the discussion of proximate cause in Annot.,
13 A.,.R.2d ii (i950).
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In Corbett v. Clarke,5 4 the plaintiff had executed a release after
dismissing a prior action against another dentist and a corporation.
Dr. Clarke entered a plea of release which the trial court accepted.
The Supreme Court of Appeals considered the question as to wheth-
er a dentist whose wrongful acts cause substantial injury to a patient
is liable for the separate and distinct injuries flowing from the negli-
gence of the original tortfeasor. 55 The defendant had treated the plain-
tiff on numerous occasions subsequent to the original injury and had
failed to discover the true condition of an infected gum. The court
held that the damages were separate and distinct, and the plaintiff
could maintain her suit.
The Reed case 56 previously discussed, involved this problem be-
cause the plaintiff's sight problems could have been caused by either
the administration of the drug or by his disease. The court stated
that "if the proof leaves it equally probable that a bad result might
have been due to a cause for which the defendant was not responsible
as to a cause for which he was responsible the plaintiff cannot re-
cover."5 7 The jury had held for the plaintiff under proper instruc-
tions, and the court would not disturb this decision. The question of
proximate causation was close enough in Vann v. Harden5 s so that
Justice Eggleston dissented from the majority opinion on this very
ground. He felt that there had not been an adequate showing that
there was a causal connection between the defendant's actions and
the infection which led to the loss of the plaintiff's leg. The majority,
however, felt that the evidence supported the verdict.
The difficulty of proving that the defendant's negligence was the
proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury is often intensified by the
fact that the injury complained of may often be the natural and
logical result of the disease or injury for which the plaintiff is be-
ing treated. Consequently the principles applicable to the ordinary
negligence case cannot be ignored merely because there are other prin-
ciples to be considered. Many a malpractice case has fallen in shambles
around the feet of a plaintiff's attorney, even though he effectively and
exhaustively proved malpractice, because he failed to prove proximate
cause.
U187 Va. 222, 46 S.E.2d 327 (1948), commented upon in 6 Wash. & Lee L. Rev.
103 (1949).
W187 Va. at 224, 46 S.E.2d at 328.
rNote 37 supra.
U175 Va. at 293, 8 S.E.2d at 288; see also Hunter v. Burroiughs, 123 Va. at





One of the most controversial developments in the law of medi-
cal malpractice has been the application of the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur.59 Despite the recent controversy over this rule of law, courts
for some time have been asked to apply it. In fact, its application has
been urged in Virginia from the time of Hunter case.6 0 There the
court quoted from the decision by Mr. Chief Justice Taft, then a Cir-
cuit Judge, in the leading case of Ewing v. Goode.61
"'If the maxim "res ipsa loquitur" were applicable to a
case like this, and a failure to cure were held to be evidence,
however slight, of negligence on the part of the physician or
surgeon causing the bad result, few would be courageous enough
to practice the healing art, for they would have to assume
financial liability for nearly "all the ills that flesh is heir
to.' "02
The court also rejected the applicability of the doctrine in Fox v. Ma-
son.6 3 The first frontal assault on the court's reticence was made in
Henley v. Mason,64 where the plaintiff lost two teeth during a tonsil-
lectomy. The customary practice at that time was to anesthetize the
patient with ether and then insert a metal gag to keep the mouth open
during the operation. When the ether spray was withdrawn, however,
the plaintiff's jaw muscles contracted and she bit down on the gag
with such force that two teeth broke off. The plaintiff appealed
from the trial court setting aside the jury verdict and maintained
that res ipsa loquitur was applicable. The court said:
"It is also a well-settled rule of law that, unless the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur is clearly applicable, then the standard for
the measure of the skill exercised is not to be left to the whim or
"'See generally Bulman, Res Ipsa Loquitur-Where Does it Apply?, 1961 Ins.
L.J. 20; Annot., 173 A.L.R. 535 (1948); Louisell & Williams paras. 14.01-15.08;
McCoid at 621. For criticisms of the application of the doctrine in malpractice
cases see Seavey, Res Ipsa Loquitur: Tabula In Naufragio, 63 Harv. L. Rev. 633
(1950); Morris, "Res Ipsa Loquitur"-Liability Without Fault, 163 A.M.A.J. 1055
(1957); Adamson, Medical Malpractice: Misuse of Res Ipsa Loquitur, 46 Minn. L.
Rev. 1043 (1962); Rossen, Defense Against Res Ipsa in Medical Malpractice, 13
Clev.-Mar. L. Rev. 128 (1964); Comment, RIL v. The Expert Witness in Malpractice
Cases, 21 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 292 (1964).
",Note 15 supra.
aNote 13 supra.
c-Quoted in 123 Va. at 137, 96 S.E. at 368.
9Note 20 supra.
"154 Va. 381, 153 S.E. 653 (1930).
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caprice of a jury upon nonexpert evidence, but is to be shown
or judged by the testimony of medical experts of good stand-
ing in the same line of practice .... A careful study of the
record leads us to the conclusion that the doctrine invoked
is not applicable when viewed in the light of the facts of this
case." 65
The court also rejected the doctrine in the United Dentists66 and
Alexander67 cases.
The doctrine was first applied in Danville Community Hospital
Inc. v. Thompson.6s The plaintiff had been burned shortly after her
birth by either the application of a hot water bottle to her body,
or by being placed in a special resuscitator bassinet. The court rejected
an attack on a verdict for the plaintiff based on the doctrine by stating
that the "doctrine applies in negligence cases where the instrumen-
tality which caused an injury is within the exclusive possession and
control of the person charged with negligence, and such person has,
or should have, exclusive knowledge of the way that instrumentality
was used, and the injury would not ordinarily have occurred if it had
been properly used." 69
The court recognized that it had hitherto refused to apply the
doctrine, stating that the doctrine only applies to certain factual situa-
tions. The leading California case of Ybarra v. Spangard,7° was quoted
by the court with restrained approval, but approval nonetheless.
The principal discussion of this doctrine in Virginia took place
in the 196o federal court opinion in Dietze v. King.7 1 The plaintiff
had undergone a radical mastectomy 72 and was treated at the defen-
dant's office for a period of time until she left for England with the
defendant's knowledge. Following her arrival in England, X-ray pho-
tographs were taken and the presence of a surgical sponge in the
operative wound was discovered. It was subsequently removed. The
trial judge held that under the facts of the case it seemed clear that
Virginia would, in a similar case, invoke the doctrine of res ipsa loqui-




69186 Va. 746, 43 SE.2-d 882 (1947). Although this is a case involving a hospital
the principles are equally applicable to physicians.
611d. at 757-58, 43 S.E.2d at 887.
7025 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P.2d 687, 162 A.L.R. 1258 (1944), cited and quoted in
186 Va. at 761-62, 43 S.E.2d at 488-89. See Louisell & Williams para. 14.07.
71184 F. Supp. 944 (E.D. Va. 196o).
72A mastectomy (also mammectomy) is an amputation of the breast. Stedman at
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tur.73 The court held that the doctor was not negligent in leaving the
sponge in the wound because of certain complications which arose
during the operation.74 However, the plaintiff's wound had con-
tinued draining, and the defendant had even noted the possibility
of a foreign body being in the wound in his records. 75 The usual
practice in the community was to resort to X-rays to check on such
suspicions, and in failing to do so the defendant was negligent.
7 6
The court decided that the "very nature of the omission in leaving
a sponge or other foreign body in the operative wound following an
open operation commands the invocation of the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur."'t7 The judge also discussed the effect of applying the doc-
trine in Virginia and he concluded that: 1) it avoids a directed verdict
for the defendant at the close of the plaintiff's case since it permits
an inference of negligence; 2) it avoids a directed verdict for the de-
fendant at the close of all the evidence unless he offers uncontradict-
ed evidence explaining the accident in terms excluding any negligence
on his part or leaving the question of negligence in balance; and 3)




Because of the nature of the injury, and of the negligence in-
volved in such a case, the application of the pertinent statute of limi-
tation has been somewhat of a problem in many jurisdictions.79 The
Virginia court has not had to face this problem, but it is generally as-
sumed that the tort statute for personal injuries will be applied un-
73184 F. Supp. at 946. See also 14 Michie's Juris., Physicians and Surgeons, pp.
53-54 (Cum. Supp. 1963).
"For a discussion of emergencies arising during an operation see Louisell &
Williams para. 9.o5. Cf., Stetler & Moritz 139, 142.
"184 F. Supp. at 948.
7See Annot., 115 A.L.R. 298 (1938).
7184 F. Supp. at 946. The doctrine has been consistently applied in foreign
body cases. See Note, Negligence-Res Ipsa Loquitur-Application to Medical Mal-
practice Actions: 1951-1961, 60 Mich. L. Rev. 1153, 116o-61 (1962); Louisell &
Williams para. 14.o6, esp. n. 52; Stetler & Moritz 381; McCoid at 61o.
78184 F. Supp. at 946-47.
'See, e.g., Louisell & Williams paras. 13.01-13.12; Stetler & Moritz 388-92; Lillich,
The Malpractice Statute of Limitations in New York and Other Jurisdictions, 47
Cornell L.Q. 339 (1962); Comment, 29 U. Kan. City L. Rev. 91 (1961); Note,
Statutes of Limitations in Medical Malpractice Cases, 42 Iowa L. Rev. 97 (1956).
See also Note, 64 W. Va. L. Rev. 412 (1962); Comment, 13 Wash. & Lee L. Rev.
264 (1956); Annot., 144 A.L.R. 209 (1943); Annot., 74 A.L.R. 1317 (1931).
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less a special contract is involved,S0 Seventeen jurisdictions, but not
Virginia, have passed special statutes applicable only to such actions.8'
The wrongful death statute would probably be applicable if death
resulted from the treatment.82 Most states have held that the peri-
od starts running from the date of the wrongful act and not from
the date that the negligent act was discovered,8 3 but fraudulent con-
cealment might toll the statute. However, some affirmative act beyond
mere silence on the part of the physician is ordinarily required before




It has been universally recognized that expert testimony is re-
quired in a malpractice case, and from the very first case Virginia has
applied this rule. 5 The necessity for the testimony of other doctors
has created grave frustrations for plaintiff's attorneys, and it has also
been the greatest source of criticism of the body of malpractice law.86
Doctors are naturally quite reluctant to testify against fellow doctors
and to state that their compatriots fell below the standards of the com-
'Va. Code Ann. § 8-24 (Repl. Vol. 1957) (tort-two years); Va. Code Ann. §
8-13 (Repl. Vol. 1957) (contract-three years); 12 Michie's Juris., Limitation of
Actions § 19 (195o); 14 Michie's Juris., Physicians and Surgeons § 15 (195).
However, the contract statute may never be applicable since a malpractice suit is
almost always for personal injuries. See Dawson v. Fernley & Eger, 196 F. Supp.
816 (E.D. Va. 1961).
sLillich, note 79 supra at 358; Louisell & Williams para. i3.oi.
'Va. Code Ann. § 8-633 (Supp. 1964).
sLillich, note 79 supra at 358; Louisell & Williams para. i3.o6; Stetler R:
Moritz 389. Cf. Richmond Redevelopment & Housing Authority v. Laburnum
Constr. Corp., 195 Va. 827, 8o S.E.2d 574 (1954).
84Va. Code Ann. § 8-33 (Repl. Vol. 1957). See Lillich, note 79 supra at 363-64;
Louisell & Williams para. 13.1i; Stetler & Moritz 389; Pickett v. Aglinsky, lo
F.2d 628 (4 th Cir. 1940) (case arising from West Virginia).
SHunter v. Burroughs, 123 Va. at 136-38, 96 S.E. at 367; Henley v. Mason,
154 Va. at 384, 153 S.E. at 653; Alexander v. Hill, 174 Va. at 253, 6 S.E.2d at 663;
Reed v. Church, 175 Va. at 293, 298, 8 S.E.2d at 288, 29o; Nardini v. Gilbert, 26o
F.2d at 178. See generally 14 Michie's Juris., Physicians and Surgeons §§ 12-21
(1951); Annot., 14L A.L.R. 5 (1942); Note, Malpractice and Medical Testimony,
77 Harv. L. Rev. 333 (1963). The courts repeatedly base their adherence to this
rule on the 1897 case of Ewing v. Goode, note 61 supra.
"'E.g., see Belli, An Ancient Therapy Still Applied: The Silent Medical Treat-
ment, 1 Vill. L. Rev. 250 (1956), replied to in Stetler, Medical-Legal Relations-
The Brighter Side, 2 Vill. L. Rev. 497 (1957). See also Murphy, Medical Malpractice,
7 Def. L.J. 3 (196o); Comment, Expert Testimony in Medical Malpractice Cases,
17 U. Miami L. Rev. 182 (1962).
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munity,s7 This reluctance must not be too readily condemned by the
legal profession, however, because attorneys have been no less reluctant
to take the witness stand and testify against another attorney, or for
any other reasonSS The need for expert testimony and the difficulty
in obtaining such testimony has given rise to a number of sugges-
tions and plans for alleviating the problem.89
(a) Medical Treatises and Pamphlets
One of the many suggestions has been to allow the use of medical
treatises, texts, and pamphlets in demonstrating the standard of
care and skill which should have been exercised.9 0 The proponents
of this innovation have urged that these texts be used as affirmative
proof and not solely for impeachment purposes. At this time appar-
ently only three jurisdictions have allowed such use-Alabama by ju-
dicial decision,9 ' and Massachusetts92 and Nevada 93 by statutes. The
statutes require the plaintiff to give the titles of the treatises and the
authors' names to the defendant at least three days prior to trial.
This suggestion has been considered by a federal court in Vir-
ginia and a peripheral problem has been considered by the Supreme
Court of Appeals. In Lawrence v. Nutter,94 the plaintiff was treated
by the defendant in Fredericksburg for a severe fracture of the left
elbow and released to return to his home in Martinsville. At home
he was placed under the care of another physician who discovered the
6See, e.g., Agnew v. Parks, 172 Cal. App. 2d 756, 343 P.2d 118, 122-23 (1959);
Bernstein v. Alameda-Contra Costa Medical Ass'n, 139 Cal. App. 2d 241, 283
P.2d 862 (1956); Huffman v. Lundquist, 37 Cal. 2d 465, 234 P.2d 34, 45 (1951);
Butts v. Watts, 290 S.W.2d 777, 779 (Ky. 1956); Johnson v. Winston, 68 Neb. 425,
94 N.W. 607 (19O3); Steiginga v. Thron, 3o N.J. Super. 423, io5 A.2d 1o (1954).
"Every lawyer dislikes to take the witness stand and will do so only for grave
reasons. This is partly because it is not his role; he is invariably a poor witness.
But he steps out of character to do it. He regrets it; the profession discourages it."
Hickman v. Taylor 329 U.S. 495, 517 (1947). See also Christie v. Callahan, 124 F.2d
825, 828 (D.C. Cir. 1941).
"Agnew v. Parks, note 87 supra. See Note, Overcoming the "Conspiracy of
Silence": Statutory and Common-Law Innovations, 45 Minn. L. Rev. 1019 (g6i).
"'See Note, Medical Treatises as Evidence-Helpful but Too Strictly Limited,
29 U. Cinc. L. Rev. 255 (196o). See also Hopkins v. Gromovsky, 198 Va. 389, 94
S.E.2d 19o (956), wherein the Supreme Court of Appeals held that medical texts
may be used for cross-examination but not read to the jury.
5 Stoudenmeier v. Williamson, 29 Ala. 558 (1857). See 6 Wigmore, Evidence §§
1690-97 (3d ed. 194o).
mMass. Ann. Laws, ch. 233, § 79c. Enacted in 1949.
"Nev. Stat., 1953, ch. ioo.
01-o3 F.2d 540 (4 th Cir. 1953).
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presence of gas gangrene infection. 95 He treated the infection, but the
arm finally had to be amputated. The plaintiff maintained that the
defendant had been negligent in his diagnosis and treatment but was
not successful. At a pretrial conference the plaintiff's attorney at-
tempted to require the production of the defendant's hospital records
pertaining to the treatment of similar cases, but the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's denial of this motion.9 0
The trial court had also refused to allow the plaintiff's attorney the
use of medical treatises in the cross-examination of the defendant
and his experts. The Court of Appeals ruled "that when a witness is
testifying as an expert, it is competent to test his knowledge on cross
examination by reading to him extracts from scientific authorities,
which he recognizes as standard upon the subject matter involved, and
then ask him whether he agrees or disagrees with what has been
read." 97 The court reversed the case but left the scope of such a cross-
examination to the discretion of the trial court so that the use of the
material would be limited to the locality and period of time against
which the defendant must be tested.98 The court's ruling allows their
use only as impeachment evidence, however.
A peripheral problem was discussed in the Reed case 99 where the
plaintiff introduced the manufacturer's pamphlet accompanying the
drug as evidence of the proper method of using the drug. The
pamphlet stated that if visual acuity were reduced by the administra-
tion of the drug any further use must be curtailed. The Supreme Court
of Appeals apparently assumed that the pamphlet was erroneously ad-
mitted but held that there could be no possible prejudice to the
defendant since he had testified that he followed the directions con-
tained therein, and since the trial court had instructed the jury to
consider the pamphlet only as showing that Dr. Reed had knowledge
of the instructions contained in it.100
(b) Common Knowledge
Another avenue of escape from the so-called "tyranny of the ex-
pert" lies in the extension of the permissible areas of common knowl-
OGas gangrene infection is the infection of a wound sometimes found in
fracture cases. Stedman at 628. 1 Gray at para. 2.47 (5).




100175 Va. at 297-98, 8 S.E.2d at 29
o
. In a recent case the Supreme Court of
Appeals has held that a manufacturer's instruction pamphlet was admissible on the
question of negligence. Barnette v. Dickens, 205 Va. 12, 135 S.E.2d 1o9 (1964).
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edge' 1 on the part of the jury. This proposal attempts to allow for the
increased sophistication of present-day jurors and it alleviates the need
for expert testimony in cases in which the negligence of the defendant
might be apparent without expert testimony. This avenue is often con-
fused with res ipsa loquitur,02 and the two concepts are closely related.
They differ in that the rule of common knowledge assumes that the is-
sue of negligence involved in the case is not related to technical matters
peculiarly within the knowledge of experts. The plaintiff must still
prove the causative act or omission but he does not need expert testi-
mony to establish the standard of care.10 3 Under res ipsa loquitur the
plaintiff does not need to prove either of these elements.
(c) Impartial Testimony and Screening Panels
Two other solutions to the problem of expert testimony may be
found in the plans for either obtaining impartial medical testimony,
or for insuring the availability of an expert when the plaintiff has
a meritorious case. The first suggestion has received a great deal of
favorable comment for its use in other types of personal injury cases,
particularly in New York,104 and it has been considered in Virginia.105
A doctor is appointed from a list and becomes the court's witness,
but the parties are not bound by the doctor's findings. However, the
plan has not so far been used in a malpractice case and it might be
difficult to do so.
The second plan contemplates the creation of a Medical Malprac-
tice Screening Panel and this plan has been adopted in Virginia.106
It was accepted by the Medical Society of Virginia in ,96o,107 and the
"'-Louisell & Williams para. 14.o6; Stetler & Moritz 378-83; Scott and Herring,
Medical Malpractice in Florida, 12 Fla. L. Rev. 121, 139-41 (1959).
"'See text accompanying footnotes 59-78. See Comment, Malpractice: The Lay-
man's Common Medical Knowledge and Experience and Res Ipsa Loquitur, 47
Marq. L. Rev. 239 (1963).
'wSanzari v. Rosenfeld, 167 A.2d 625 (N.J. 1961); Stetler & Moritz 379-80.
1I4See Special Committee of The Association of the Bar of the City of New
York, Impartial Medical Testimony (1956); Comment, Impartial Medical Testimony
Plans, 55 Nw. U.L. Rev. 1o9 (1961); Impartial Medical Testimony, 27 Ins. Counsel
J. 184 (196o); Peck, A Successful New Plan: Impartial Medical Testimony, 42 A.B.A.J.
31 (1959).
'Report of Proceedings of the Virginia State Bar Association 16-35 (1961); Re-
port of the Proceedings of the Virginia State Bar Association 97-101 (1962).
1(Virgina Bar News, May 1961, pp. 12-13; Twenty-second Annual Report of
the Virginia State Bar 64-66 (1960) (hereinafter cited as Annual Report with date).
See also Louisell & Williams para. 7.02; Osbourn, Malpractice and the Tucson
Plan, 26 J.B.A.D.C. 96 (1959).
'17Annual Report 64-66 (1960).
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Virginia State Bar Council adopted it in 1961.108 One primary reason
for its adoption was the difficulty in obtaining medical testimony in
the state.109 Since its organization the panel has heard only a few
cases, 1 0 and a reason for the minimal utilization has apparently been
the reluctance of the liability insurance carriers to allow their policy
holders to submit cases to the panel."' The permanent panel consists
of the members of the Medico-Legal Committees of the Medical So-
ciety and the State Bar, but neither committee will be represented
by more than ten members. The attorney for the plaintiff initiates a
hearing by addressing a request to the Executive Secretary of the
Medical Society of Virginia accompanied by a statement of facts, an
authorization for the panel to obtain medical records, an agreement
of confidentiality, a request for a report, a statement of subscription
to the plan, a fee, and a written consent to a hearing signed by the
defendant and his attorney.
1 2
The panel will "consider only whether, in the light of the mater-
ial presented, there is a reasonable possibility that the acts complained
of constitute professional negligence, and whether there is a reasonable
medical probability that the claimant was injured thereby."" 2 Where
the panel has rendered an opinion favorable to the claimant, the
panel and the Medical Society will cooperate with him in obtaining
expert testimony. The panel's opinion is not binding on either party.
As the plan receives more publicity and is better understood it will
probably be used more frequently.114
VI
EMERGENCY TREATMENT
One further problem which has arisen in recent years relates to
"08Ibid.
"'Annual Report 61 (ig6i).
="Virginia Bar News, October 1962, pp. 2-4. Letter from Harry P. Anderson,
Jr., Chairman of the Virginia State Bar Committee on Cooperation with the
Medical Profession, May 13, 1962; Letter from Robert I. Howard, Executive Sec-
retary of the Medical Society of Virginia, May 21, 1963.
muAnnual Report 57-58 (962); Annual Report 56-57 (1963); The Executive
Council of the Virginia State Bar has recommended that the medical malpractice
screening panel be authorized to hear cases even though the consent of the physician
and his attorney cannot be obtained. 12 Virginia Bar News No. 6. p. 4, cols. 2-3
(June 1964).
n'The complete plan is set forth in Annual Report 62-65 (1961); copies of the
plan may be obtained from the Virginia State Bar or the Medical Society of Vir-
ginia in Richmond, Virginia.
"3Annual Report 64 (ig6i).
"'Letter from Robert I. Howard, Note 11o supra.
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the rendering of emergency medical treatment-often no more than
intelligent first aid-by a physician at the scene of an automobile
accident. Although a doctor has no legal duty to render such care to
persons who are not his patients, there is an ethical duty to do so. n 5
In response to the reluctance of doctors to stop at the scene because
of the fear of possible legal action by a complete stranger," 6 and in
reaction to cases allowing recovery in such a case, the state of Cali-
fornia passed the first "Good Samaritan" statute in 1959.117 Three
years later Virginia passed a similar statute providing immunity for
a doctor rendering emergency care for a roadside or highway acci-
dent if no established doctor-patient relationship pre-existed such
care." 8 No cases have arisen under the law as yet.119
VII
CONCLUSION
The trial of a medical malpractice case is essentially little dif-
ferent from the trial of any other personal injury case but the dif-
ferences that do exist can mean recovery or loss, or a successful or un-
successful defense.12 0 The importance of expert testimony cannot be
overemphasized under the present rules and also because the av-
erage juror does not expect the physician to be infallible, and is gen-
erally quite understanding of the pressures under which the doctor
UStetler & Moritz 342; Opinions and Reports of the Judicial Council, American
Medical Association 27 (1960).
2"Stetler & Moritz 334-
nqlbid; Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § .144; Louisell & Williams para. 9.05, n.51.
Many authorities consider this problem to be greatly overemphasized since appar-
ently there are no reported cases involving such an action. Averbach, Good Samar-
itan Laws, 69 Case and Com. 13 (March- April 1964).
"'Va. Code Ann. § 54-276.9 (Cum. Supp. 1962). See also, Comment 43 B.U.L.
Rev. 14o (1963), wherein a similar statutory enactment in Massachusetts is dis-
cussed, and Comment, 41 Neb. L. Rev. 609 (1962).
"°Some question has been raised regarding the constitutionality of such statutes.
Stetler &- Moritz 335.
2'-Most of the texts previously cited are excellent practical guides to the trial
of such a case with Louisell & Williams being particularly outstanding in the opinion
of this writer. A good law review article written by a practitioner experienced in
these cases is Ames, Modern Techniques in the Preparation of Trial of a Medical
Malpractice Suit, 12 Vand. L. Rev. 649 (1959). This and several other Vanderbilt
Law Review articles cited herein are compiled in Roady and Andersen, Professional
Negligence (196o). See also Kramer, Medical Malpractice (1962), a pamphlet pre-
pared by the Practicing Law Institute; 7 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts, Malpractice
479-600 (196o); The Defense Research Institute, Inc., Medical Malpractice (1962);
Cusumano, Malpractice Law Dissected for Quick Grasping (1962).
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works.' 21 There are, of course, two basic problems in this field. The
first one is that a suit may be filed for its nuisance value because doc-
tors are naturally quite reluctant to bare the question of their profes-
sional competence before a jury and the public. 12 2 Second, there is al-
ways the danger that a meritorious claim will fail because of the
plaintiff's inability to secure expert testimony.
123
The Medical Malpractice Screening Panel affords a splendid me-
dium for alleviating these problems but it needs greater acceptance
throughout the state. There must also be more interchange of ideas
on subjects of mutual interest between the professions of law and medi-
cine.124 The Standards of Principles Governing Lawyers and Physicians
in the Commonwealth of Virginia125 reflect an attempt to bridge the
gap of misunderstanding. With the tremendous rise in personal in-
jury cases the two professions are thrown together more often, and
the field of medical jurisprudence has become a full-fledged specialty
in both professions. A fuller understanding of the law of medical
malpractice on the part of lawyers and doctors may help to eliminate
one of the more formidable stumbling blocks to understanding and
mutual respect.
2nSee Power, "After All, Doctors Are Human," 15 Fla. L. Rev. 463 (1963).
21One reason for this reluctance has been the fear that such publicity could
affect their practice. An American Medical Association study came up with some
interesting conclusions through a survey participated in by forty-one state medical
societies. Thirty of these replies indicated that such a suit had little or no effect
on the reputation and practice of the physician involved. Of thirty-eight more
specific replies, thirty-two felt that the duration of any effect would be a matter
of only weeks or months; five felt the effects would last several years; and only
one reply stated that the duration of any effects would be about two years. How
State Medical Society Executives Size Up Professional Liability, 164 A.M.A.J. 580
(1957).
13A recent text analyzes 123 malpractice cases decided in recent years by var-
ious trial courts. Of this number the plaintiff won only 24% of the cases, which was
further broken down into: i) diagnosis-12% recovery rate; 2) treatment-25%
recovery rate; 3) operations-3o% recovery rate; and in eighteen cases of dental mal-
practice the recovery rate was 28%. Statewide Jury Verdicts: Verdict Expectancies
401-07 (Va. Ed. g6i). It is difficult to say whether these low recovery rates are
due primarily to a failure to obtain expert testimony, but this remains the plain-
tiff's main problem.
""See Murphy, Medicine and the Law: A Socially Necessary Alliance, 53 J. Ind.
State Med. Assoc. 2066 (196o), reprinted in Averbach and Belli, Tort and Medical
Yearbook 723 (g6i).
'-These Standards were adopted by the Virginia State Bar and the Medical So-
ciety of Virginia in 1958. They relate primarily to medical reports, physicians as
witnesses, and physicians' fees and services. Copies of these Standards in pamphlet
form may be obtained from either the State Bar or the Medical Society.
